Market Surveillance of Products

Published: 27 May 2013

Policies & Issues: Internal Market - Compliance, Standards & Enforcement

The Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation on Market Surveillance of Products (MSPR) paves the way to improved market surveillance, among other through more detailed obligations, Union action against products presenting a serious risk and a system of mutual assistance.  To unleash this potential, we call on the European legislator to improve the Commission’s proposal so as to ensure a level-playing field among market operators and legal certainty. In particular, there is a need to:

  • Clarify that market surveillance authorities evaluate potential risks and non-conformities posed by products placed on the market. This is different to the manufacturers’ risk and conformity assessment which is carried out before these are placed on the market (article 1).
  • Add a definition for “non-compliant product” or modify the definition of “product presenting a risk” to include the compliance check with applicable Union harmonisation legislation as a pre-requisite to market surveillance authorities’ (MSAs) “risk” evaluation (article 3.13).
  • Align economic operators’ obligations and the concept of non-compliance with the New Legislative Framework (articles 8 and 9).
  • Encourage market surveillance authorities’ participation in standardisation (article 6).
  • Frame the Commission’s implementing powers, both by limiting the scope and the time span of implementing acts (article 9.5 and 12.1). The Commission should be requested to decide promptly on whether a market surveillance measure is justified or not (article 11.4).
  • Remove market surveillance authorities’ right to challenge the law itself (article 13.3).
  • Grant economic operators a more efficient right of redress than with national courts, in case of dispute with the decisions of market surveillance and customs authorities (article 10.7).
  • Ensure that RAPEX notifies only products presenting a serious risk and includes the economic operator’s arguments in response to the claimed infringement (articles 19.1 and 20.2).
  • Establish a standing Advisory Board composed of relevant European stakeholders to provide input and feedback to the European Market Surveillance Forum (article 25).
  • Subject the envisaged EU reference laboratories to European accreditation (article 28.2).
  • Ensure that sanctions are proportional to the seriousness of the infringement and the size of illegitimate revenue, instead of to the size of the undertaking (article 31.2).

Related Position Papers

Internal Market: Joint Industry recommendations for effective Harmonised Standardisation [6 July 2021]

Internal Market: Joint open letter on industry competitiveness and EU standardisation [1 February 2021]

Internal Market: Orgalim comments on the NLF evaluation roadmap [2 December 2020]

Internal Market: Orgalim comments on the 2020 draft Blue Guide [13 November 2020]

Internal Market: Orgalim comments on the Draft Guidelines for the practical implementation of Article 4 of Regulation 2019/1020 on market surveillance and compliance of products [22 April 2020]

Internal Market: Shaping a New Deal for the Single Market: Harmonised standards in support of a competitive European industry [27 January 2020]

Internal Market: Suggestions for a revision of the Blue Guide on the implementation of EU product rules 2016 [27 January 2020]

Internal Market: For a restored mutual trust in a market-relevant European Standardisation System [24 September 2019]

Towards effective, efficient EU market surveillance: all for a level-playing field without additional burdens for legitimate manufacturers [6 December 2018]